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Psychological theories often invoke interactions but remain vague regarding the 
details. As a consequence, researchers may not know how to properly test them, and 
potentially run analyses that reliably return the wrong answer to their research 
question. We discuss three major issues regarding the prediction and interpretation 
of interactions. First, interactions can be removable in the sense that they appear or 
disappear depending on scaling decisions, with consequences for a variety of 
situations (e.g., binary or categorical outcomes, bounded scales with floor- and 
ceiling-effects). Second, interactions may be conceptualized as changes in slope or 
changes in correlations, and since these two phenomena do not necessarily coincide, 
researchers might draw wrong conclusions. Third, interactions may or may not be 
causally identified, and this determines which interpretations are valid. We illustrate 
each of these issues with examples from psychology and issue recommendations for 
how to best address them in a productive manner. 
 
“Forty-two!” yelled Loonquawl. “Is that all you’ve got to show for seven and a half 
million years’ work?” 
“I checked it very thoroughly,” said the computer, “and that quite definitely is the 
answer. I think the problem, to be quite honest with you, is that you’ve never actually known 
what the question is.” 
“But it was the Great Question! The Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and 
Everything,” howled Loonquawl.” 
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Interactions are ubiquitous in psychological science. Person-situation interactions, 
stress-vulnerability models, gene-environment interactions: a large number of theoretical 
perspectives postulate that the effect of one variable depends on another variable. 
Interactions often seem highly plausible from a substantive perspective, and many empirical 
investigations consider them the central target of inquiry. Thus, it is no surprise that 
statistical procedures to test for interactions—running an ANOVA or multiplying the 
supposedly interacting variables and entering the product as a predictor in a regression 
analysis—are standard part of the training of psychological researchers. 
Establishing an interaction might seem like a straightforward task; however, there is a 
range of potential complications. For one, ​reliably ​detecting interactions can be a challenge. 
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that interaction claims are less replicable 
(Beck & Jackson, 2020; Open Science Collaboration et al., 2015)​, and there are a-priori 
reasons to expect so. To find interactions where an effect is attenuated in one group, but not 
reversed compared to the other group, surprisingly large sample sizes are needed ​(e.g., 
Gelman, 2018; Giner-Sorolla, 2018; Lakens, 2020)​. This means that existing interaction 
effects are harder to confirm in empirical studies—but also that reportedly significant 
interactions are more likely to be false-positives, or even point in the wrong direction. 
Furthermore, studies with experimental interventions might only afford one plausible main 
effect but many different interactions to be considered (e.g., intervention times ​any 
demographic variable assessed), leading to a large number of researcher degrees of 
freedom which may further increase the risk of false-positives. 
These issues affect the replicability of interactions. However, there are other issues 
with interactions that can result in ​reliably ​mistaken conclusions. Re-running the same study 
will not fix or reveal those issues—instead, one may get the wrong answer, every time. 
Some of these issues can be identified by close investigation of the data alone. For example, 
Hainmueller et al. ​(2016)​ discuss two problems and how to address them: the standard 
approach to interaction assumes a linear interaction effect which can be a misspecification; 
and estimates can be misleading if there is little data underlying certain regions of values 
(e.g., if, at some values of one of the interacting variables, there is little variability in the other 
interacting variable). But there is another set of issues that cannot be resolved by careful 
consideration of the data alone.  
It is three such replicable issues with interactions on which we want to focus in the 
present article: The scale dependence of interactions, the distinction between moderation of 
slopes versus moderation of correlation, and the causal identification of interactions. We will 
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work through each of these issues with a motivating example based on data that have been 
simulated (which ensure that we know the true model) followed by relevant examples from 
the literature. 
All of these issues have been discussed before, sometimes in great detail and clarity, 
often within specific substantive contexts, and we will highlight some of these works 
throughout the manuscript. But a look at contemporary publications in psychological journals 
suggests that researchers with a substantive focus often do little to address them. This may 
have multiple reasons: (1) researchers may not be aware of them; or (2) they may consider 
them esoteric details without consequences for their own substantive conclusions; or (3) 
they simply may not know how to address them best. Thus, in the present manuscript, we 
aim to (1) clearly explain these problems using simulated data; (2) illustrate how they can 
indeed affect substantive conclusions in published research; and (3) provide constructive 
recommendations on how to address them. 
Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Interactions are Scale 
Dependent 
Motivating Example 
A large company is testing a mentoring program with the hope of increasing 
employee retention. For this purpose, they have randomly assigned 10 percent of their 
employees to participate in the program, and they plan to evaluate its effects on quitting one 
year later. But then a global pandemic forces a change of plan and due to distancing 
measures, only half of the employees can work on-site, with the other half working remotely. 
The decision who still works on site has been randomized. All the while, the mentoring 
program is continued through video conferencing. 
Once the time has come for the evaluation of the mentoring program, there are now 
two questions that can be evaluated: Did the mentoring program reduce quitting? And did it 
do so equally for on-site and remote workers—in other words, was there an interaction 
between the mentoring program and work location? 
All models reported in this manuscript have been estimated in ​brms​ ​(Bürkner, 2017, 
2018)​ using default, weakly informative priors. Note that all the problems discussed in this 
manuscript occur regardless of whether a frequentist or a Bayesian approach is chosen, 
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whether you run an ANOVA or a regression; however, ​brms ​as a highly flexible statistical 
package allows us to adapt the models and procedures to easily mitigate the problems 
discussed here. Table 1 shows results from a logistic regression on simulated data in which 
the binary outcome quitting (0: no, 1: yes) was regressed onto three predictors: mentoring 
program participation (0: no, 1: yes), working on-site (0: no [remote work], 1: yes), and the 
product term of the two (mentoring*working on-site). 
 
Table 1 
Results from a Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Quitting from Participation in the 
Mentoring Program, Working On-Site, and Their Interaction 
Note.​ ​N​ = 10,000, data have been simulated.  
 
As hoped for, the mentoring program had a negative effect on subsequent quitting. 
However, working on-site increased subsequent quitting quite dramatically, possibly 
because employees had health concerns or child care duties that could not have been 
fulfilled otherwise. Intriguingly, the coefficients from the logistic regression indicate an 
interaction: Among those who worked on-site, mentoring led to a smaller reduction in 
quitting—in other words, it seems like the program was less effective on-site (and more 
effective remotely). 
A logistic regression models the effect of the predictors on an underlying continuous 
unbounded scale (here, a latent propensity towards quitting, which might be understood as 
job dissatisfaction) which is linked to the observed binary outcome (quitting yes/no) with a 
logistic function, see Figure 1.  
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Variable Coefficient 95% Credible Interval 
Intercept -3.06 [-3.20; -2.92] 
Mentoring -1.46 [-2.38; -0.70] 
Working on-site 2.90 [2.74; 3.05] 
Mentoring*working on-site 0.87 [0.09; 1.81] 
 
 
Figure 1.​ Effect of the mentoring program on quitting on logit scale (x axis) and on 
probability scale (y axis), for employees who worked remotely (blue) or on-site (red). 
 
This link function ensures that the model only predicts possible values, probabilities 
that lie between 0 and 1. The horizontal bars on the x-axis visualizes the effect of the 
intervention for on-site employees (red bar) and remote employees (blue bar) on the logit 
scale. The intervention led to a larger reduction for remote employees (i.e., the horizontal 
blue bar is longer than the horizontal red bar). While the model coefficients need to be 
interpreted on the the assumed underlying Logit scale, our model also allows us to make 
statements about the effect of the program on a different scale, the ​probability ​of quitting. 
This can be done by comparing the ​vertical ​bars in Figure 1, or by simply plugging the model 




Latent Quitting Propensities as Predicted by the Logistic Regression Model and the 
Corresponding Predicted Probabilities of Quitting 
 
Now, the picture changes. Mentoring changed the probability of quitting for remote 
employees from 4.5% to 1.1%, a decrease of 3.4 percentage points. But for on-site 
employees, mentoring reduced the probability of quitting from 46.0% to 32.1%, by as much 
as 13.9 percentage points. Because we have estimated the models in brms, we can easily 
estimate credible intervals for any particular metric of interest (see ​osf.io/apxtv​) for more 
details). The estimated differences between the mentoring effects in the two groups is an 
astounding 10.5 percentage points, 95% CI: [-15.2; -5.8]. Hence, it very much looks like the 
intervention is ​much ​more effective on-site. 
We have already arrived at conclusions that are diametrically opposed (mentoring 
was more effective remotely vs. mentoring was more effective on-site), but let’s consider yet 
another outcome metric. A decrease from 4.5% to 1.1% corresponds to a relative risk of 
1.1/4.5 = 0.24, 95% CI: [0.09; 0.52], which means that the risk of quitting was reduced by 1 - 
0.24 = 0.76 = 76% for remote employees. In the group working on-site, a decrease from 
46.0% to 32.1% corresponds to a relative risk of 0.70, 95% CI: [0.60, 0.80], which means 
that the risk of quitting was reduced by 1 - 0.70 = 0.30 = 30%. Thus, the relative risk 
reduction was much larger in the group working remotely, and we might once again 
conclude that the intervention is more effective among remote employees. 
Which interpretation is the correct one? 
We have now arrived at conclusions that seemingly contradict each other: a positive 
interaction, a negative interaction, and once again a positive interaction. However, these 
findings are perfectly compatible, they simply re-state the same pattern on different scales. 
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 Latent quitting propensity ​q  
(q)P = eq1+eq  
 
not on-site, no mentoring -3.06 4.5% 
not on-site, mentoring -3.06 - 1.46 = -4.52 1.1% 
on-site, no mentoring -3.06 + 2.90 = -0.16 46.0% 




On the assumed latent continuous quitting propensity, which might be understood as 
dissatisfaction with the job, the mentoring effect is larger for remote employees. However, 
the reduction in the probability of quitting is much larger for on-site employees. And the 
relative reduction in the probability of quitting is once again larger for remote employees. 
Readers from psychology might favor to evaluate the interaction by interpreting the 
interaction term from the logistic regression model; hence, their conclusions would apply to 
the latent continuous quitting propensity. For example, Simonsohn ​(2017)​ distinguishes 
between “conceptual interactions” that arise from “variables actually influencing each other”, 
captured by model coefficients (here: the logit coefficients); and “mechanical interactions” 
that arise from the non-linearity of the model (and are implied to be less interesting because 
they will supposedly arise​ in any case​). The substantive interpretation of the coefficients 
from the nonlinear model assumes a continuous underlying latent variable that is linked to 
the observed outcome (quitting) following a certain functional shape (here: a logistic 
function). Psychologists may or may not be willing to endorse these assumptions, but they 
are hardly ever made explicit—interpreting interaction coefficients from nonlinear models 
directly seems a default solution rather than a principled decision. 
Researchers from other fields have arrived at diametrically opposed preferences, 
generally favoring probabilities as the relevant outcome scale. For example, an editorial 
comment in ​American Sociological Review​ states that “[t]he case is closed: don’t use the 
coefficient of the interaction term to draw conclusions about statistical interaction in 
categorical models such as logit, probit, Poisson, and so on” ​(Mustillo et al., 2018)​. Likewise, 
the seminal paper on interaction terms in nonlinear models in economics ​(Ai & Norton, 2003) 
does not even consider the possibility that the coefficient of the interaction term might 
correspond to anything of particular interest.  However, we should not let disciplinary norms 3
dictate our scaling assumptions, but instead motivate them for the question at hand ​(Hand, 
1994)​. 
In the example presented above, the “right” scale depends on the decision that has 
to be made. If the company wants to keep as much of their workforce as possible while 
saving mentoring costs during the pandemic, it might be most effective to restrict mentoring 
to on-site workers, because that would prevent more resignations. In other words, the 
probability scale would be of central interest. But after the pandemic, things may look 
differently. The company decides to remain partly remote, and they have good reason to 
3 In general, economists are fond of linear probability models which model the probability of the 
outcome as a linear function of the predictors, rather than assuming a non-linear link function. 
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believe that the high quitting propensity among on-site workers was restricted to pandemic 
conditions. Thus, it might be most effective to focus mentoring efforts on remote workers, 
because their job dissatisfaction (i.e., the latent quitting propensity) is reduced more strongly. 
In other words, the logit scale would be of central interest. 
The Scale Dependence of Interactions 
In cognitive psychology, the scale dependence of interactions has been pointed out 
more than 40 years ago by ​(Loftus, 1978)​.  He noted that when response probabilities are 4
used as the dependent variable, some interactions can be “removed” by assuming a 
different mapping between response probability and the assumed underlying component of 
memory, and concluded that such interactions may be uninterpretable. Three decades later, 
Wagenmakers et al. ​(2012)​ followed up on the phenomenon. Studying citation histories, 
questionnaires, statistical textbooks and published articles, they illustrated how experimental 
psychologists had largely remained unaware of the problem. Judging from the published 
literature, psychologists from many non-experimental fields have remained at least as 
unaware, although there are of course exceptions. For example, Johnson ​(2007)​ provides a 
clear discussion of the problem in the context of research on gene-environment interactions, 
and Murray et al. ​(2016)​ develop scaling recommendations for this field. 
Thus, it may be important to note that the scale dependence of interactions is a 
broad phenomenon that affects all substantive fields, and that applies to a wide variety of 
situations. Conclusions about the magnitude of interactions, and, in some cases about their 
presence and sign (see Wagenmakers et al., 2012, for different scenarios) depend on 
scaling decisions. Scaling decisions might be trivial when there is a single natural mapping 
between the observed measure and the underlying process or construct of interest. 
However, this is rarely the case. The following examples illustrate the relevance of this 
phenomenon. 
Substantive Examples 
Flattening the Curve.​ Our World in Data ​(Roser et al., 2020)​ presents the incidence 
of people testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 per capita, across countries, in an interactive 
chart. Viewers can toggle whether they want to see the comparison on a linear or a 
log-linear scale. The log-linear scale makes it easiest to judge which countries are doing 
4 There is also a large body of literature on the subject in other fields such as epidemiology (see e.g., 




better at flattening the curve, that is, reducing new infections below the numbers expected 
based on the current number of infected people. We might want to make this comparison if 
we want to find out whether public health interventions in one country are more effective 
than in another. However, the linear scale makes it easier to judge which countries are 
currently worst affected, and makes it easier to see, for instance, which countries will 
exhaust the number of available intensive care units sooner. 
Summer break gaps. ​It has been reported that test score gaps between advantaged 
and disadvantaged students grow fastest during summer vacation, which has been 
interpreted as evidence that the major sources of inequality lie outside of the school context. 
Note that the pattern describes an interaction between time and socio-economic status on 
students’ academic abilities. There is no single defensible mapping between students’ 
abilities and their responses on the test items—thus, scale dependence may be an issue. 
von Hippel and Hamrock ​(2019)​ demonstrated empirically that conclusions about the growth 
of gaps are sensitive to whether one analyzes (an estimate of) the number of correct 
answers, or an ability estimate from an item response theory model. 
The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness.​ Happiness research routinely 
employs single-item measures that seem at best ordinal in nature. Hence, the question 
arises how actual happiness—which we can plausibly assume to be continuous—relates to 
the observed categorical answers. Bond and Lang ​(2019)​ explore how different assumptions 
about the underlying distribution (such as skewness) of happiness affect substantive 
conclusions. One of their examples highlights how the supposed relative decline in 
US-American women’s happiness since the 1970s can be “removed” by assuming that the 
happiness distribution is left-skewed. 
Recommendations 
There is no way to circumvent the fact that conclusions regarding interactions often 
rest on scaling assumptions. But as with all assumptions, there are ways to address them 
that are more productive than simply glossing over them. 
First of all, not all interactions can be removed or reversed. If an interaction is 
non-removable, the qualitative conclusion that there is a certain interaction pattern is robust 
under various scaling assumptions, namely strictly  monotonic transformations of the link 5
5 Wagenmakers et al. (2012) state that “a nonremovable interaction can never be undone by a 
monotonic transformation of the measurement scale” (pp. 145). However, consider the (admittedly 
pathologic) case of the constant function: if we transform the outcome scale so that every single 
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function. Cross-over interactions can be considered non-removable; Wagenmakers et al. 
(2012) provide a more detailed investigation into the conditions under which interactions are 
removable (or not). 
Second, as with all assumptions, scaling assumptions should be spelled out and 
reflected upon. For example, many psychologists might not be aware of the precise 
assumptions that they implicitly endorse by analyzing an ordinal outcome scale as if it were 
continuous ​(Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019; Liddell & Kruschke, 2018)​; or by analyzing sum scores 
as opposed to estimates from more complex models; or they may be unaware of the 
features of the link function their model uses. A thorough consideration of the assumption 
one is willing to make may lead to a suitable statistical model; and testing whether the 
interpretation changes under different assumptions becomes a natural robustness test. 
Third, if multiple scaling assumptions could be justified or are familiar to readers, 
there is little reason not to show the data multiple ways, perhaps even in an interactive plot. 
Results regarding both main effects and interactions should be reported for all of them. For 
example, the coefficients from logistic (or probit) regression models should be supplemented 
by probabilities of the outcome. As demonstrated above, this is easily done for the simple 
2x2 case without additional covariates; Ai and Norton (2003) and McCabe et al. ​(2020) 
provide guidance for more complex scenarios. 
 
individual has the same value, ​all ​interactions are undone (and so are all main effects). So there 
exists a monotonic transformation that removes nonremovable interactions. Of course, the constant 
function may not be particular relevant for empirical research, but there are other cases of 
monotonous but not strictly monotonous transformation that are of interest: ceiling- and floor-effects, 
in which all individuals past the scale boundaries are assigned the same value. Ceiling- and floor 
effects may remove nonremovable interactions when the reversal of the direction of the effect occurs 
outside of the scale boundaries. 
6 In this section, we focus on floor and ceiling effects that result from flawed measurement of 
quantities that are assumed to be unbounded. Of course, there are also variables that are inherently 
bounded (e.g., one cannot have fewer than zero children in a household). 
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Box 1: Floor- and Ceiling-Effects 
There is one particular issue of scale dependence that stands out because (1) it is 
common, in particular in subfields relying on rating scales and because (2) it requires less 
nuanced consideration than other cases, because a flawed measurement model is at the 
root of the interpretation issue.  6
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Researchers who use rating scales will often notice that values are not nicely 
distributed across the scale range, but bunch up at the lower or upper scale end. Such 
scales can easily induce spurious interactions. Consider the simulated data in Figure 2, 
Panel A, which shows the relationship between a predictor and an outcome in two groups 
marked by color. As we can see by the equal slopes of the two regression lines, there is 
no interaction between predictor and the color-coded group membership.  
 
Figure 2. ​Effect of a predictor variable on an outcome in two different groups. Panel A: no 
interaction. Panel B: ceiling effect induces a spurious interaction. Panel C: an ordinal 
variable induces a spurious interaction. 
However, assume that the measurement device that we were using suffered from 
a ceiling effect as shown in Panel B. Suddenly, the slopes between the regression lines 
differ, and a regular regression analysis would indicate an interaction between the 
predictor and group membership, with the slope in the group closer to the ceiling being 
flatter. This interaction is dependent on the assumption that there is a linear mapping 
between the measured outcome and the unobserved metric of interest across the whole 
range of observed values. In other words, the regression model assumes that all 
individuals at the ceiling do indeed have the same value on the outcome, rather than 
exhibiting some variability that got censored by the scale. If we want to be open to the 
possibility that such variability exists, we can instead run a regression model with 
censoring. All observed outcomes at the upper limit of the scale are labeled as 
 
7 Running such a model only requires minor modifications of the model syntax in the R package ​brms​, 
see details on the Open Science Framework (​osf.io/apxtv​). 
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right-censored (i.e., we assume that we only know that they have the observed value ​or 
higher​) — and suddenly, the spurious interaction disappears.   7
Panel C shows a scenario that is even more common in psychology. The outcome 
variable from panel A has been mapped to an ordinal scale, such as a Likert scale. Again, 
values can only occur within the scale's bounds. If we model the outcome as with a regular 
linear regression model, we would infer an interaction. If we instead estimate an ordinal 
regression, for instance a cumulative model with equidistant thresholds (Bürkner & Vuorre, 
2019), the interaction disappears. 
Problems caused by ceiling- or floor-effects are exacerbated the stronger the main 
effect of the moderator on the outcome is, as this will push individuals with certain 
moderator values closer to the boundaries of the scale. In such scenarios, we suggest that 
the best course of action is more clear cut than in more subtle ones described above. 
Many measures in psychology aim to yield approximately normal distributions. But normal 
distributions cannot always be ensured across research settings and moderator 
categories, so if measures are bounded, but the latent quantity is not, we need to account 
for this flaw of our measure in our model. Not doing so can result in interactions that 
should not be interpreted in a substantive manner, as they can be explained by more 
realistic measurement assumptions—variability beyond the range of the scale; a lack of 
symmetry in the mapping between the metric of interest and the observed response; rating 
scales being ordinal rather than metric.  
Models building on such more realistic assumptions are not routinely used within 
psychology, and they are not implemented in many common software packages. In our 
experience, many researchers think that such models do not make much of a difference 
for results anyway, and thus only complicate analyses. The former intuition may draw on 
experiences regarding the estimation of main effects, and we concede that these may 
often be surprisingly robust to measurement issues, but this is not the case for 
interactions. The latter concern may be justified: more complex models are more 
complicated to run and to interpret. However, as mentioned above, the R package ​brms 
affords a lot of flexibility. Appropriate models for censored and skewed data can be 
implemented in a straightforward manner, and ​(Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019)​ have written an 
excellent tutorial for ordinal regression models. 
 
 
Same Slope does not Imply Same Correlation 
Motivating Example 
A group of researchers predicts that satisfaction with one’s job matters more for 
overall well-being among singles. To test their hypothesis, they collect within-subject daily 
diary data on both job satisfaction and overall well-being from both singles and individuals in 
relationships. Once they are ready to analyse the data, they discover that they had two 
different tests in mind. One researcher wants to compute intra-individual correlations 
between job satisfaction and overall well-being and compare their averages between singles 
and non-singles. Another researcher wants to estimate an interaction between singlehood 
and job satisfaction in a multilevel regression on overall well-being. They run both analyses 
and, to their surprise, they find that there is a substantial difference in the correlations 
between singles and non-singles, but the interaction effect is close to zero.  
What is going on here? In the simple bivariate case—one outcome (overall 
well-being), one predictor (job satisfaction)—the correlation coefficient equals the 
standardized regression coefficient, which equals the unstandardized regression coefficient 
multiplied with the ratio of the standard deviation of the predictor to the standard deviation of 
the outcome. The variability in the outcome may be further decomposed into variability that 




  r = β = b     σx σy  = b
σx 
√σ²y  
= b σx 
√σ² + σ²yexplained by X ynot explained by X
= b σx 
√b²σ² + σ²x residual(y)  
 
So if a correlation varies between groups, it can have multiple reasons. The 
underlying unstandardized effect, i.e., the slope ​b​ may vary, or the standard variability of the 
predictor may vary, or the variability of the outcome may vary. The standard procedureσx σy   
to test for an interaction effect only considers changes in the slope. Thus, a comparison of 
correlations and a comparison of slopes (i.e., a standard test for an interaction) will result in 
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different patterns whenever the ratio of variances (predictor to outcome) varies between the 
groups that are compared ​(e.g., Smithson, 2012)​. Sometimes, we may find a difference in 
correlations but no difference in slopes, as in the example above. However, it is also 
possible to find a difference in slopes but no difference in correlations, as illustrated in Box 2. 
The results observed above are hence no statistical surprise, but we still do not know 
which analysis (and which conclusion) should be preferred. The group of researchers thinks 
about the issue more deeply, and they realise that their verbal prediction—”job satisfaction 
matters more​ for overall well-being among singles”—was too vague. In fact, two of them had 
thought of quite different scenarios. One of them thought of a scenario in which, when 
singles have a bad day on the job, their overall well-being drops by more points, but good 
days give them a bigger boost (Figure 3A). This scenario corresponds to group differences 
in ​b​, and it could be directly tested with the regression model including the interaction term. 
All else being equal, a difference in slopes will also result in a difference in correlations. But 
if all else is not equal (i.e., if variances differ between groups), a difference in slopes may not 




Figure 3. ​Relationship between job satisfaction and overall well-being for individuals in 
relationships and singles. Scenario (A): larger effect of job satisfaction among singles. 
Scenario (B): same effect, but there is less unexplained variability in well-being among 
singles. Scenario C: same effect, but there is less variability in job-satisfaction among 





Another one thought about things in a different way. A one-point change in job 
satisfaction may have the same effect among both singles and individuals in a relationship. 
But being in a relationship is an additional source of variation in well-being which is 
independent of job satisfaction, and thus, partnered individuals will have more variance in 
their overall well-being that cannot be explained by job satisfaction. In this scenario, we have 
group differences in the residual variance , which result in group differences in theσ²residual(y)  
variability of the outcome  and all else (slope, variance of the predictor) being equal, itσy   
would result in a higher correlation for singles than for partnered individuals, but no 
differences in the moderation analysis difference in correlations (Figure 3B).  
As we mentioned above, another thing that could differ between groups is the 
variance in the predictor. For example, let us imagine that in our study, individuals who are in 
a relationship tend to have “settled down” with jobs that are overall more steady-going. 
Some of the singles, in contrast, have exciting jobs that come with more ups and downs. 
This corresponds to group differences in the variance of the predictor. If the slopes are the 
same in both groups, this will also lead to group differences in the variance of the outcome; 
but the differences in the variance of the predictor will be larger and thus, the correlation will 
increase (Figure 3C). 
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Box 2: Likewise, same correlation does not imply same slope 
A company wants to find out whether working from home boosts productivity. To this end, 
they randomise employees to work between zero and five days a week from home and 
measure productivity using their in-house tracking of productive hours per week. Because 
employees with children tend to be less productive, the company leadership are especially 
interested whether parents benefit from remote work more than non-parents. The parents 
have lobbied for remote work as a solution, but the leadership is skeptical. The trial is run 
and the results show that working from home benefits productivity, though the correlation 
is small. To test whether parents' productivity benefitted more substantially, the 
correlations between productivity and days worked from home are computed for parents 
and non-parents. There is no difference between the correlations. The leadership says 
they will take the results under consideration. However, one mother, worried that they will 




Figure 4. ​The association between days worked from home and productivity (measured in 
hours) for parents and non-parents. The blue vertical lines show the standard deviations of 
productivity and of the residual variation. The blue horizontal line shows the standard 
deviation of days worked from home. 
 
As she patiently explains, the black line is steeper for parents. This means that, on 
average, their productivity was boosted more by working from home, almost enough to 
close the parent productivity gap. But should there not be a difference in the correlations 
as well then, the leadership asks? Yes, ​if ​all else were equal. But as the raw data shows, 
parents' productivity fluctuates much more than that of non-parents (i.e., productivity is 
heteroskedastic​ across parenthood). Although she cannot pinpoint the exact reason, lost 
sleep and the perennial infections brought in from daycare seem like good candidates. 
She has days where she gets almost no hours of productive work done, but—after the 
occasional good night's sleep—also some days of eight hour focus. Childless colleagues 
exhibit much stabler productivity and rarely drop below 4 hours a day. Working from home 
allowed her to manage her time better, and reduced scheduling conflicts, but the 
fundamental factors of sleep and health remain the same. The leadership cares about 
optimising average productivity. That the productivity of parents fluctuates so much in 
ways that are unrelated to their company policy is not under their control. Hence, 
 
 
Choosing the Appropriate Model 
Phrases which we routinely use to formulate verbal predictions, for example, "matters 
more", "stronger influence",  or "more important for" could refer both to steeper slopes or 
larger correlations. In psychology, where many constructs are measured in abstract 
quantities like points on a Likert scale, standardised effect sizes (e.g., Pearson's 
product-moment correlations or standardised regression coefficients) are so widespread that 
the distinction between slopes and correlations may often be lost. However, as we have 
shown above, the distinction matters when we want to ensure that we are actually testing 
our substantive hypotheses. 
As a first step, we need to be more specific about what our theory actually says 
(Hand, 1994)​. Verbal theory specification leaves room for ambiguities; formalizing our 
theories with the help of equations or computational models can remove these ambiguities 
(Smaldino, 2017) and force us to think more carefully about slopes and variances, along with 
many other assumptions and predictions. Going even further, the resulting statistical 
hypotheses could be reported in a machine-readable format which results in a maximum of 
clarity and transparency ​(Lakens & DeBruine, 2020)​. But even just a simple data simulation, 
such as the examples above, can help clarify the relationship between substantive 
hypothesis and patterns in the data. Once we have a better understanding of what we want 
to test, we can start thinking about the appropriate statistical model. 
If a difference between slopes is of interest, we are firmly in the territory of 
interactions and may, for example, simply include the product term between the variables of 
interest. But what should we do if our hypothesis concerns the variance components? It may 
be tempting to simply compare correlations, but as we have seen above, correlations are 
sensitive to differences in slope, differences in the variance of the predictor, and differences 
in the variance of the outcome. Thus, depending on our hypothesis of interest, the 
correlation coefficient may be too “coarse” and miss important patterns in the data, and we 
should instead explicitly model the variance of interest.  
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comparing correlations was clearly not the right test for their question--instead, they 
should have looked at the slope, the effect of days worked from home on productive 
hours. While this example may seem contrived, weaker versions of these patterns occur 
frequently and can cause over- and underestimation of the effects of interest.  
 
Once again, the flexibility of ​brms ​pays off—it allows us to implement distributional 
models in a straightforward manner ​(Bürkner, 2020; Umlauf & Kneib, 2018)​. To understand 
how these models work, let’s quickly think about what a simple “regular” regression model 
does. In a standard regression model, we are predicting an outcome which is normally 
distributed. This normal distribution is described by two parameters: its mean and its 
standard deviation (which captures the residual unexplained by our model). When we 
include predictors, these variables explain the first parameter, the mean of the normal 
distribution; the standard deviation is assumed to be constant across all observations. A 
distributional model additionally allows us to include predictors to explain the second 
parameter, the residual standard deviation. 
We can use this approach to simply test, for example, whether a continuous variable 
has an effect on the standard deviation of another variable. If we additionally include 
predictors for the mean, we can then test whether the residual standard deviation—the 
variability not explained by the predictors included for the mean—varies depending on the 
level of some third variable. Concerning our example above, we could ​simultaneously ​test 
for an interaction in the narrower sense (difference in slopes) and for group differences in the 
residual standard deviation (differences in unexplained outcome variability) by running the 
following model in ​brms​: 
overall well-being ~ job satisfaction * single 
sigma ~ single 
The first line represents the standard interaction analysis which can be interpreted in 
the usual manner. The second line allows the residual standard deviation to vary depending 
on whether or not individuals are single. Here, a negative coefficient would indicate that the 
residual standard deviation is smaller among singles, which captures the idea that there is 
less unexplained variability among singles, as they lack a romantic relationship which 
constitutes a major source of variability in well-being. On OSF, we provide more detailed 
code examples (​osf.io/apxtv​). 
Substantive Examples 
Individual importance weighting. ​Rohrer and Schmukle ​(2018)​ investigated 
importance weighting — the idea that individuals judge the overall quality of their lives by 
aggregating their satisfaction with various life domains. In this model, more important 
domains receive higher weight, and in the literature, this is normally captured by including 
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interactions between domain satisfaction and domain importance ratings (e.g., by including 
the product term​ importance rating of health*satisfaction with health​). However, after 
publication, we discussed whether importance weighting could not also be interpreted as 
improved prediction—for example, when regressing overall life satisfaction on health 
satisfaction, there should be less unexplained variance among individuals who consider 
health very important for their health. The substantive literature on the topic does not take a 
clear stance on what exactly is meant by “weighting” as it mostly relies on vague 
verbalizations, which probably go unchallenged because the underlying notion (“things that 
are important matter more”) is so intuitive. 
Partner preferences after entering a relationship.​ Gerlach et al. ​(2017) 
investigated the stability of partner preferences in a sample of singles. At time 2, a 
substantial proportion of participants had entered a new relationship. Gerlach et al. were 
interested in whether partner preferences changed more among those who found a partner. 
In a standard moderation analysis, the slope of partner preferences at time 1 on preferences 
at time 2 was highly similar among singles and those who found a partner. For example, on 
average, people who expressed a strong preference for attractiveness at time 1 did so again 
at time 2, regardless of whether they had found a partner in the meantime. However, among 
singles, the individual data points were closer to the regression line—at time 2, they deviated 
less from their preference at time 1—which resulted in a higher correlation across time. 
Individuals who had found a partner had adapted their preferences to better match the traits 
of their actual partners (e.g., if their partner fell short of their preference for attractiveness at 
time 1, they reported a weaker preference for attractiveness at time 2). This adaptation to 
the partner reduced the correlation with preferences at time 1, but not the slope. 
Moderation of heritability by socioeconomic status: ​Initial studies reported that 
the heritability of intelligence was moderated by the family’s socio-economic status 
(Turkheimer et al., 11/2003)​. However, heritability refers to the ​proportion ​of variance in the 
population explained by genetic differences.​ ​Hancscombe et al. ​(2012)​ re-investigated the 
question with unstandardized variance components. They found that the result was driven by 
differences in the environmental variance component: among high-status individuals, there 
was less variability in the environment. At the same time, the unstandardized amount of 
variance explained by additive genetics was similar across the range of socioeconomic 
status. While this pattern results in a higher heritability estimate, it should not be interpreted 
as increased importance of genes at higher levels of socioeconomic status—instead, it 




Meta-analysis of standardised effect sizes.​ Meta-analysts commonly investigate 
standardised effect sizes, such as correlation coefficients, across studies. These may 
conflate differences related to the research question (differences in slope, in the magnitude 
of effects) with unrelated differences (differences in variances, e.g., due to measurement 
error in the outcome variable, range restriction in the predictor). This leaves researchers at 
risk of spurious inferences about effect size heterogeneity, publication bias, and 
between-study moderators ​(Wiernik & Dahlke, 2020)​. So should we instead aggregate 
unstandardised effects? Unfortunately, the lack of standardisation in psychology means that 
effects are difficult to bring to a single metric by means other than standardisation using the 
observed standard deviation and mean ​(but consider e.g., the percentage of the maximum 
possible, Cohen et al., 1999)​. Luckily, there are productive ways forward. Researchers can 
explicitly account for measurement error and selection effects (Wiernik & Dahlke, 2020). 
Furthermore, with well-validated instruments, such as IQ tests, standardisation with norm 
data (rather than with data from the sample which may vary in idiosyncratic ways) could 
avoid the problems discussed here. As a side effect, this would also allow researchers to 
quickly notice when a sample only covers a restricted range of values (e.g., because only 
psychology students were included). 
Causal Identification of Interactions 
Motivating Example 
A group of researchers is interested in how a stress reduction program affects participants’ 
subsequent subjective well-being. For this purpose, participants are randomly assigned to 
either participate in the treatment or in a control condition. Furthermore, the researchers are 
interested in how the intervention interacts with participants’ personality, which they 
assessed before the intervention took place. 
In their first analysis, they regress subjective well-being at the end of the study on (1) 
a binary indicator of whether or not participants were in the treatment condition, (2) 
participants’ neuroticism, measured before the intervention took place and (3) the product of 






Results from a Regression Analysis Predicting Subjective Well-Being from Treatment, 
Neuroticism and their Interaction, plus Gender (Analysis 2), plus the interaction between 
Treatment and Gender (Analysis 3) 
 
Note.​ ​N​ = 1,000, data have been simulated.  
 
These numbers suggest that the treatment interacts with the neuroticism of the 
treated individual, with bigger treatment effects among the more neurotic. However, the 
researchers are aware that women have reliably higher neuroticism than men, and one of 
them suggests that female gender should thus be statistically controlled for. The results from 
their second analysis can be found in Table 3, Analysis 2. The statistical evidence for the 
interaction remains mostly unaffected. Thus, they provisionally conclude that, even 
controlling for female gender, the treatment still has bigger effects among the more neurotic. 
But then a colleague makes them aware of a blog post that highlights that 
interactions require “interaction controls” ​(Simonsohn, 2019; see also Yzerbyt et al., 2004)​, 
and so they dutifully run a third analysis. Lo and behold, their third analysis reveals an 
interaction between female gender and treatment, but the interaction with neuroticism that 
was initially of interest has disappeared (Table 3, Analysis 3).  8
8Inclusion of the interaction between treatment and female gender also changed the main effects of 
female gender and neuroticism, which are not of central interest here. There is no simple 
interpretation for these coefficients—giving a substantive interpretation to the coefficients of 
confounders and modifiers in multiple regression analyses constitutes an instance of the so-called 
table 2 fallacy (Westreich & Greenland, 2013). However, given that these are simulated data, we can 
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 Analysis 1 Analysis 2 Analysis 3 
Variable b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI 
Treatment 
yes/no 
2.85 [2.68; 3.01] 2.88 [2.73; 3.03] 2.11 [1.92; 2.29] 
Neuroticism 0.06 [-0.04; 0.15] -0.09 [-0.18; 
-0.01] 
0.05 [-0.04; 0.13] 
Treatment*Neu
roticism 
0.38 [0.25; 0.51] 0.33 [0.21; 0.45] -0.02 [-0.16; 0.11] 
Female Gender - - 0.92 [0.77; 1.07] 0.06 [-0.14; 0.24] 
Treatment*Fem
ale Gender 
- - - - 1.84 [1.57; 2.13] 
 
The Question of Causality 
The previous example hints at the existence of two different types of 
“interaction”—one that is causal in nature, and another one that is not. VanderWeele ​(2009) 
refers to them as interaction (the effect of one treatment is causally changed by another 
variable) and effect modification (the effect of the treatment co-varies with a third variable), 
but other terms have been used elsewhere. For example, psychologists may understand 
interaction to refer to both phenomena (as we did in this article, up to this point), and 
subsequently distinguish between (causal) moderation and statistical interaction. To us, the 
terminology seems less important than a clear understanding of the phenomena, so we are 
going to talk about “causal interaction” versus “effect modification” to maximize the 
distinction. 
A causal interaction refers to a scenario in which (hypothetically) intervening on the 
third variable would change the effect of the treatment (see VanderWeele, 2009, for 
formalized definitions). This may often be the intended meaning when psychologists 
hypothesize ​interactions. In the example above, the researchers may have speculated that 
there is something about the treatment that makes it more effective for neurotic individuals, 
not because of their gender, but because of their neuroticism—it may target particular 
cognitive processes such as anxiety and worries that affect them more frequently.  
Experiments are the ideal design to identify and test causal interactions. If both the 
treatment and the third variable have been manipulated by the researcher, a causal 
interpretation is warranted. Factorial experiments, which are frequently evaluated with the 
help of ANOVAs, neatly illustrate the symmetric nature of causal interactions. If two variables 
A and B interact causally, it is appropriate to state that the effect of A depends on the level of 
B, just as it is appropriate to state that the effect of B depends on the level of A. 
explain their behavior. The data were simulated in a manner that (1) the effect of the treatment 
depends on gender, (2) gender has no effect beyond that interactive contribution, and (3) neuroticism 
is an outcome of gender but of no further relevance. Because analysis 2 omits the interaction between 
the treatment and gender, part of this interaction ends up in the coefficient of gender. Why is the 
coefficient of neuroticism negative, even though neuroticism is not the cause of anything in our data 
generating model? Controlling for gender, the meaning of neuroticism changes to “anything in 
neuroticism that is not determined by gender”—in our particular example, as we simulated no other 
causes of neuroticism, this is simply a random variable which we may call U. The interaction term 
between treatment and neuroticism will systematically overpredict outcome values for participants 
who are high on neuroticism for their gender—i.e., participants which happen to have a high value on 
U. To “compensate” for the overprediction, U—or simply “neuroticism” in the output—gets a negative 






Of course, experimental investigations are not always feasible or even just possible, 
and so researchers might sometimes want to consider an interaction in which one or both of 
the variables were not randomized. In such a scenario, inferring a ​causal ​interaction is equal 
to inferring causation from correlation—an endeavor that heavily depends on domain 
expertise and additional assumptions ​(see, e.g., Rohrer, 2018 for an introduction)​. One step 
into this direction, as illustrated in the example above, consists of the control of third 
variables that confound the association between the non-randomized variable and the 
outcome. Interactive control is necessary; in practice the inclusion of multiple interactions at 
once can lead to unstable estimates—here, variable selection procedures can help 
(Blackwell & Olson, 2020)​. 
Sometimes, researchers might not be primarily interested in ​causal ​interactions, but 
rather concerned about effect modification. In a clinical trial, it might be of interest to see how 
effective the treatment is within different subpopulations. For example, researchers might 
find out that the treatment works best among individuals with certain comorbidities, and that 
information might be helpful for treatment planning, regardless of whether it is the other 
condition or one of its causes that (causally) interacts with the treatment. Unlike causal 
interaction, effect modification can be asymmetric. In our example above, it is correct to say 
that neuroticism modifies the effect of the treatment. However, this does not mean that the 
treatment modifies the effect of neuroticism — in fact, the data have been simulated so that 
neuroticism has no causal effect on subjective well-being at all. 
Considering the example above, if effect modification had been the only question, 
researchers might have stopped after the first analysis and concluded that neuroticism does 
indeed modify the effects of the treatment. Of course, it is unclear to which extent that 
information would have been useful in this particular case: If the goal of the analysis is 
substantive understanding, we need to figure out why effect modification occurs; and if the 
goal is the identification of subpopulations which would benefit most, gender can be 
assessed more economically than neuroticism. 
Substantive Examples 
Personality moderates the effects of mindfulness on well-being.​ Much in line 
with our simulated example, de Vibe et al. ​(2015)​ investigated whether personality 
(neuroticism and conscientiousness) moderates the effects of mindfulness training among 
23 
 
students. They found that the intervention reduced mental distress particularly well among 
students with higher scores on neuroticism. While their analysis contained control variables 
(gender and baseline values of the outcome), they did not include the interaction between 
those control variables and treatment, and thus failed to account for alternative explanations 
(e.g., treatment effect may vary depending on gender, treatment effect may vary depending 
on initial level of mental distress). Thus, only effect modification should be concluded. 
Nonetheless, the article prominently discussed interpretations of a causal interaction 
between neuroticism and treatment, such as differences in emotional reactivity.  
Personality moderates the effects of cultural tightness on cultural adaptation. 
Geeraert et al. ​(2019)​ investigated how students participating in intercultural programs 
adapted culturally to their host countries. They found that adaptation was lower for host 
countries with tighter cultures (i.e., cultures in which norms are more rigidly imposed). But 
this effect was moderated by personality; for example, students scoring high on 
honesty-humility showed high cultural adaptation even in tight cultures. Their longitudinal 
analyses do not account for potential confounders between personality and cultural 
adaptation and thus, only effect modification may be concluded. Nonetheless, the discussion 
section invoked the fit between personality and social norms as an explanation, which clearly 
assumes a causal role of personality (i.e., if we could intervene on personality, we would 
expect that this has subsequent effects on adaptation to tight cultures). Noticeable, the 
authors also suggested that poor fit between students and host countries may be very costly, 
and that selection with an eye for personality fit might hence be sensible. This conclusion 
would be justified even in a scenario of “mere” effect modification in the absence of 
interactions, since personality may be able to predict how a student adapts to a certain 
culture ​regardless ​of whether it is the cause of adaptation. 
Country-level gender quality moderates the effects of gender x age on 
self-esteem. ​Bleidorn et al. ​(2016)​ investigated cross-sectional age trajectories of 
self-esteem in a sample spanning 48 nations. Overall, they found that on average, men 
reported higher levels of self-esteem (i.e., a gender gap), and so did older individuals, with 
no significant interaction between age and gender on average. However, these associations 
significantly varied across countries. Thus, in exploratory analyses, the authors investigated 
whether country-level characteristics moderated gender specific age-trajectories (i.e., they 
investigated the triple-interaction term gender x age x country characteristic). They found 
that, in countries with higher gender equality, the gender gap in self-esteem shrank with age. 
While it may be tempting to give a substantive causal interpretation to this pattern—women 
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who, through increased gender equality, have better access to high status jobs and the 
political sphere, end up with higher self esteem—the authors pointed out that gender 
equality is highly correlated with other country characteristics, such as GDP per capita and 
the Human Development Index. Thus, it may only be justified to conclude effect modification; 
the actual cause of gender differences in age trajectories of self-esteem may lie in other 
factors. 
Recommendations 
It is very well possible that a variable modifies the effect of another one without a 
causal interaction between the two (as in the example above), and even that there is a 
causal interaction without effect modification (although this requires that different effects 
cancel each other out, see VanderWeele, 2009). Thus, for researchers to arrive at the right 
conclusion, it is important that they can distinguish between the two—and determine which 
one is relevant in a given situation. 
If the purpose is to test a specific hypothesis derived from a theory, a helpful question 
to consider is “Would I expect that an intervention on the third variable changes the effect of 
the other variable?” In the case of our example: “Would an intervention that reduces 
neuroticism, such as psychotherapy, reduce the treatment effect of our stress reduction 
intervention?” If the answer is yes, a causal interaction is of interest, and if the third variable 
cannot be manipulated, all the concerns of causal inference on the basis of observational 
data apply ​(see, e.g., Rohrer, 2018)​. 
Of course, not all interaction questions arise a priori, and sometimes a researcher 
might be confronted with the coefficient of a product term and struggle to find the right 
interpretation. Here, helpful questions to consider could be: “Assuming that the main effect of 
the third variable was of central interest, would the present study design allow me to interpret 
it as a causal effect under reasonable assumptions?” If the answer is yes, a causal 
interpretation may be warranted. If the answer is no, subsequent interpretations should take 
into account that one cannot conclude that a manipulation of the third variable would change 




Box 3: Interaction Issues Interact 
The three issues we consider here cannot be considered in isolation. When the issues 
interact and models become more complex, formal models, data simulation, and 
visualization are even more helpful. To give an example of how these issues interact, if we 
want to correctly estimate effects on residual variance, we cannot ignore that our measure 
has a ceiling and a floor. If we did, we would underestimate the residual variance whenever 
a value is close to the scale's lower or upper limit, because values can only deviate in one 
direction. This could result in an illusory effect on residual variance, if, for instance, the 
investigated moderator has a strong main effect, driving values to the limit. New statistical 
software, such as brms, makes it easy to formulate the appropriate distributional models 
(Bürkner, 2020)​ with small changes (e.g., it only takes a small tweak to switch from 
predicting the residual standard deviation in a Gaussian regression to predicting the 
discrimination parameter in an ordinal regression, which inversely relates to the standard 
deviation of the latent variable). 
To give another example, if we would adjust our interaction effect for a potential confounder 
to better fit our causal model, we should also adjust for the confounder when estimating 
effects of the moderator on residual variance. Again, it is easy to estimate multiple effects on 
the residual standard deviation in brms, but difficult to do the same in the more established 
framework of correlational analysis. 
In the introduction, we wrote that questions of nonlinearity of interactions can be resolved by 
careful examination of the data, whereas the issues we discuss here often require us to 
interrogate our assumptions. However, if we observe only subsets of the data, for example, if 
we have an old and a young cohort in our study that were recruited in different ways, we 
could run into the question of causal interaction or effect modification. If we observe that age 
effects on our outcome of interest are flattened in the older group is it because recruitment 
methods act as a moderator? Or is the effect of age simply nonlinear but the two parts of the 
curve we can see look straight? Such problems are another common version of the question 
of causal interaction or effect modification. 
Finally, questions of scale dependence and linearity of effects also come up when predicting 
distributional parameters other than the mean, such as the residual standard deviation. 
Again, brms allows for distributional assumptions and link functions to be changed and for 
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nonlinear effects on all distributional parameters to be estimated using, for instance, 
thin-plate splines ​(Bürkner, 2020)​. 
Conclusion: Better Answers, Better Questions 
In this manuscript, we have discussed three issues. First, conclusions about 
interactions depend on scaling decisions, and flawed measures can lead to spurious 
interactions. Second, moderation of slopes is not the same as moderation of correlations. 
Third, effect modification is not the same as causal interaction. If researchers are not aware 
of these distinctions, they might accidentally analyse the data in a manner that returns the 
technically correct answer to the wrong question ​(Hand, 1994)​. This disconnect between 
research questions and statistical analyses can result in misled conclusions. 
These issues may seem daunting, and after considering how these issues interacted 
(see Box 3) one may be tempted to conclude that the best course of action is to stop 
investigating interactions altogether. Some weaker variation of this notion may be defensible. 
Many psychologists seem enthusiastic about increasingly complex claims about interactions 
(“boundary conditions”), mediation (“processes”, “mechanisms”), and any combination of the 
two. This enthusiasm should be tempered: Complex claims require very large samples and 
strong designs; they come with methodological complications like the ones outlined above; 
and they require reliable knowledge about more basic aspects (e.g., measurement 
properties, response biases, main effects). Our enthusiasm for complex claims may actively 
hinder the quest for such reliable knowledge: Researchers are disincentivized from 
conducting “less exciting”, “less novel” basic research, and thus it is quite possible that we 
end up building on sand. 
At the same time, we concur with Lakens and Caldwell ​(2019)​ that there are benefits 
of examining interactions. For example, they entail risky predictions that allow for particularly 
informative tests of competing theories, and they may help address issues of generalizability 
across different populations. Thus, instead of putting interaction research on hiatus, we 
should  strive for improved interaction research. 
Approaching the issue from the empirical side, researchers should pay closer 
attention to the details of their data and their model. Classical regression diagnostics 
(Belsley et al., 1980)​, such as plotting fitted values against residuals, are often taught, 
occasionally practiced, and rarely reported. In a Bayesian workflow, these diagnostics can 
be seen as special cases of posterior predictive checks (generating data from the model and 
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comparing it to the real data, see Figure 5, ​(Gabry & Mahr, 2018; Gelman et al., 2020)​. Such 
checks can uncover where the model falls short, such as assuming homoskedasticity, or 
ignoring ceiling and floor effects. Research articles frequently only report estimates from 
linear models and select simple slopes graphs, but this leaves readers in the dark about the 
details of the data. Following the recommendations by ​(McCabe et al., 2018)​, raw data and 
estimates should instead be depicted in so-called small multiples with individual plots for 
several simple slopes. Online supplements also make it possible to habitually share 
diagnostic plots, especially for complex models where simply graphing the raw data is 
insufficient to evaluate the model. 
 
 
Figure 5.​ Posterior predictive checks for a simple interaction model based on three different 
data-generating processes. The distribution of the outcome is shown along with 
model-predicted distributions for ten samples. Panel A: The model distribution shows a good 
fit to the real data. Panel B: A floor effect is apparent in the real data, but not part of the 
model. Panel C: Heteroskedasticity makes for an awkward fit between real data and model 
predictions. 
 
As a pedagogical tool, we have generated Figure 6, a triple triptych in homage to 
Anscombe's quartet ​(Anscombe, 1973)​. Every row represents a different interaction scenario 
resulting in identical simple slopes plots (black lines) and linear regression results. The first 
row shows the "ideal" scenario, which many researchers will naively assume: only the slopes 
differ by moderator level. The middle row shows how a floor effect in the measurement scale 
can cause the illusion of an interaction, even though only main effects were simulated at the 
latent level. The third row shows a scenario in which slopes and correlations exhibit reverse 
patterns: while the slope increases with higher moderator values, the correlation decreases 
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(i.e., in the low moderator panel the values scatter the least from the regression line). 
Importantly, a researcher who only runs a linear model and reports the resulting coefficients 
and simple slopes would not be able to distinguish between these scenarios, although they 
lead to different substantive conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 6.​ Columns show levels of the moderator variable (M). X and M are the same across 
rows, whereas Y has been generated according to different scenarios but maintains the 
same mean and variance. The slopes estimated according to a simple linear interaction 
model (black lines) are the same across rows, but graphing the raw data shows that the 
data-generating processes were quite different. Shaded regions around the regression lines 




Careful consideration of the details of the data is important, but as we have noted in 
the beginning, it is not sufficient to solve the issues highlighted in this manuscript. No 
amount of graphing can answer questions about scaling assumptions or causality, or tell us 
what exactly our research question is and how it could be tested. This leads us to a broader 
underlying issue. 
In an idealized scenario, one may start with a substantive research question and then 
choose the appropriate statistical analysis. One may mistakenly pick the wrong analysis, but 
course corrections are possible as the goal of the analysis is clear. If the research question 
was formulated as a generative model, finding flaws in the analysis strategy is even possible 
before data collection. In our experience, the actual research process often works quite 
differently. The research question is rather vague to begin with (“How do X and Y affect Z?”), 
and statistical analyses are chosen for a variety of reasons (e.g., domain norms, familiarity, 
publishability, implementation in popular statistical packages), but not for their capability of 
providing appropriate answers.  
So the necessary course corrections may be much broader, as the underlying 
problem concerns our research questions and theories ​(Hand, 1994; Muthukrishna & 
Henrich, 2019)​. Psychological theories are often vague verbalizations that accommodate 
many different readings and corresponding statistical models. Researchers might “theorize” 
that one construct interacts with another one but leave open what pattern is to be expected. 
Arguments about the empirical support for such a vague hypothesis are futile as it is not 
even established what exactly is being predicted. Thus, ultimately, some broader rethinking 
of the field may be necessary, with a stronger focus on formal modeling ​(Guest & Martin, 
2020; McElreath, 2020; Smaldino, 2017)​, more rigorous theorizing, and more precise 
research questions. 
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